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Abstract 
In the late 1990s, Indonesia - the world’s most populous Muslim nation - began a transition from 
authoritarian rule.  At the time, many commentators expressed concern about the security threat 
posed by Islamist militancy in the wake of Suharto’s downfall. Initially, Indonesia did witness a 
proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups and a heightened security environment. Yet, in the 
decade and more since then, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialise at least 
strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions. First, has Indonesia really contained 
its extremist threat? Secondly, if so, how and what lessons, if any, can we draw? The following 
article examines the extent to which Indonesia’s security concerns have actually diminished.
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Introduction
n the late 1990s, Indonesia - the world’s most populous Muslim nation - began a transition 
from authoritarian rule.  At the time, many commentators expressed concern about the security 
threat posed by militant Islamists in the wake of Suharto’s downfall.[1] Initially, the 
archipelago did witness a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups.[2] Yet, in the following 
decade since the transition, the worst-case scenarios have failed to eventuate and proved to be 
largely unfounded. In fact, Indonesia today in coordination with international partners has reduced 
its potential threat environment at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting 
questions. First, has Indonesia really contained its paramilitary/extremist threat? Secondly, if so, 
how and what lessons, if any, can we draw? In order to answer these questions, the best thing to do 
is to take a closer look at the nature of the security threat and responses to it.
Taxonomy and Context
The first thing to note is that militant groups in Indonesia are numerous and a pretty mixed bag.[3] 
Of course, this is of no great surprise considering the size, diversity and history of the archipelago. 
For our purposes, the main Islamist ones are broken down here on the proviso that I am not 
providing an exhaustive list and limit myself to the most visible groupings. These groups usually 
have either direct or indirect ties to larger hard-line organisations and they are typically factional in 
character. We can include (in no particular order) the following groups: Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI 
- Defenders of Islam Army) operates as the paramilitary wing of the hardline vigilante organisation 
Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front). There is Laskar  Jihad  (LJ  -  Army  of  
Jihad) that operates as a  militant  offshoot  of  Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah 
(FKAWJ - Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet). Similarly, the 
I
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paramilitary Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI - Indonesian Mujahidin Militia) has ties to Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI - Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly).[4]
Somewhat differently, the roots of Ring Banten, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI - Islamic Congregation) and 
Angkatan Mujahideen Islam Nusantara (AMIN - Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces) trace back to the 
Dar-ul-Islam movement (DI - Abode of Islam). Both DI and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII - 
Indonesian Islamic Army) formed out of revolutionary Islamic militias that helped fight the long 
fight against Dutch colonial rule. In fact, many of the contemporary groups in some ways trace an 
insurgency connection and their ‘repertoires of violence’ back to the formation and structures of 
these anti-colonial militias.[5] 
It is also worth noting that in the aftermath of independence, the secular oriented nationalism of 
both Sukarno and Suharto frustrated the political ambitions of militant Islamic organisations by 
imposing major restrictions on them. In fact, Sukarno banned both DI and TII but their cadre 
continued to fight for the establishment of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII – Indonesian Islamic State) 
under the leadership of S.M. Kartosuwiryo between 1948 and 1963.[6] Their numbers peaked in 
and around the 13,000 mark, primarily in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. They did eventually 
suffer defeat after a concerted and bloody campaign by the Indonesian military culminating in the 
capture and execution of Kartosuwiryo in 1962. DI and TII subsequently unraveled but memories, 
attachments and frustrations from that period still have resonance with sections of the populace in 
the aforementioned areas.
Contemporary Variants 
Of course, a significant difference between now and then is an  influx of hadrami (Indonesians 
of Middle Eastern descent). Some of these arrivals fought with the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 
late 1980s and brought with them substantial combat experience. Many of whom have gone on to 
provide influential tutelage over the years.[7] 
With the rise of a new globally networked terror landscape groups like JI started presenting 
themselves as a regional franchise of al-Qaeda with links across Southeast Asia.[8] It claimed to be 
pursuing along with its pan-regional partners the establishment of darul Islam nusantara (an 
archipelagic Islamic state) as a core objective. How much of this is actual reality and how much of 
it illusory propaganda was and is difficult to gauge. What is telling is that in a post-modern age of 
mediatized conflict and our largely self-generated ‘climates of fear’, image and perception function 
as powerful tools of combat.
Although big on rhetoric and the ratcheting of fear, there is no denying that JI did pose a very real 
security threat as evidenced by its capacity to conduct jihadist operations. For instance, the 2002 
bombings in Bali and Sulawesi, the 2003 Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 suicide 
bombings at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the 2005 Bali restaurant bombings all bore a 
substantial JI stamp.[9] However, the most recent Marriot and Ritz Carlton bombings in Jakarta in 
2009 are more likely the work of a JI splinter group, probably Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad formerly led 
by the now deceased Noordin M. Top. The reason for the latter prognosis is that over the past 
decade, Indonesia’s US/Australian backed counter-terrorism squad, Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special 
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Detachment 88 -- more commonly known as Densus 88) has decimated JI’s operational capacity.
[10]It is responsible for the  incarceration  or  death  of  many  of  JI’s  leading  figures and other 
Islamist militants.[11]
Other militant groups in the archipelago seem to follow a somewhat different raison d’être. LPI and 
LJ both publicly deny any links with al-Qaeda and claim to focus firmly on domestic concerns. 
Something evidenced by their significant involvement in internecine and intra-communal sectarian 
conflicts in Central Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands. In particular, LJ views itself very much as the 
protector of Muslims in the Maluku where it retains an active presence.[12] But with long histories 
of localized intra-communal conflict, places like Central Sulawesi also provide fertile recruiting 
grounds for organisations like JI and the Abu Bakar Ba’asyir inspired Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid  
(JAT - Partisans of the oneness of God) to further peddle their radical message.[13] 
Despite denials, suspicions persist that both LPI and LJ enjoy indirect support from orthodox 
Islamic organisations, namely Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII – Indonesian Council 
for Islamic Predication) and Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam (KISDI - 
Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World). It is an ill-kept secret that DDII and 
KISDI receive substantial funding from the Middle East especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[14] 
An estimated 15 to 20 percent of all Saudi charity dollars sent to Indonesia end up in the hands of 
suspect groups.[15] There are also alleged links between Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat 
Krisis (KOMPAK - Crisis Management/Prevention Committee - set up in Central Sulawesi in 1988 
to help victims of flood, disaster and conflict) and the indirect channeling of funds to militant 
groups. Little or no accountability and the lack of discernible paper trails make tracing and then 
preventing the diversion of donations away from relief operations in to the hands of radicals a hard 
ask. The practice of turning of a blind eye or not following up investigations by sympathetic 
factions in the National Police Force (POLRI) and Armed Forces (TNI) alongside endemic 
corruption also plays a role in the ability of radical groups to maintain toeholds. [16]
Domestic Attitudes and Efforts
Popular sentiment in Indonesia suggests that militant Islamists lack sufficient clout or wide support. 
The majority of Indonesian Muslims are more interested in organisations that respect the rule of 
law, help combat corruption and try to address the archipelago’s economic problems within a 
constitutional framework.[17] In fact, the majority of Islamic involvement in politics in Indonesia 
remains very far from being associated with the coercive institution of an Islamist theocracy. 
Of course, given Indonesia’s recent authoritarian past dealing with radicalism and militant threats 
(especially Islamist ones) is still a sensitive political issue. The notorious UU Anti-Subversi 1963 
(Anti-Subversion Laws) are still fresh in the memories of many Indonesians and there is an 
understandable aversion towards the potential return of the sort of practices carried out under these 
laws.[18]The specter of overt security intrusion or meddling in religious affairs simply does not 
play well domestically especially when accusations of brutality continue to plague both TNI and 
POLRI in outlying regions.[19] Impinging on hard won civil rights and political freedoms runs the 
risk of antagonizing or polarizing segments o f  w h a t  i s  a  moderate Islamic majority. 
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Operational disagreement and tension between POLRI and the TNI over the way to deal with the 
problem further complicates matters.[20] 
Although critics complain of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s overly tentative handling of 
these issues, his presidential directive in March 2010 did authorize the new National 
Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT - Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme).[21] It may fall 
well short of a ‘game changing’ response but at least it is a step in the right direction for 
coordinating efforts. To its credit, Indonesia has tried with some success to balance ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ approaches in dealing with its radical militant problem. This largely stems from 
recognition of the often counter-productive tendencies the exclusive reliance on incarceration 
and prisons elicits. Prisons can act as incubators for extremism by way of radicalisation, training 
and recruitment.[22] 
Rather than merely adopt a traditional ‘hard’ approach of tactical assaults, punishment and 
detention, Indonesia’s ‘smart’ program of disengagement and de-radicalisation is similar in some 
ways to ones run in Malaysia and Singapore.[23] Putting issues of under-resourcing and ad-hoc 
institutionalisation aside for a moment, the ‘soft’ approach angle involves a three-pronged strategy. 
If you can get imprisoned militants to recognize the destructive consequences of their actions, it can 
open a path to a credible alternative or second chance. There is then a possibility for them to 
rediscover a different Islamic meaning in their lives, a discursive one that does not include the 
destructive cycle of extreme thinking, mobilisation and violence.[24] Firstly, breaking this nexus of 
radicalisation involves a focus on persuasion.[25] Getting militants to turn away from violence and 
terrorism and reclaiming them for society is crucial for lasting containment. The thinking is that it is 
more effective in the long-term if you can convince imprisoned militants to renounce violence and 
sever previous ties rather than incarcerating them indefinitely. Secondly, encouraging inmates to 
speak out about their experiences as a warning to others and thirdly getting them to use their 
influence over other inmates to cooperate with authorities are crucial in this approach.[26] The real 
goal in all of this is to give these people a ‘way-back’.[27] Harsh treatment and indefinite 
incarceration alone simply fuels frustration, resentment and the anger of inmates and by extension 
their immediate/extended families against an outside world. Persistent punitive dealings with 
certain sections of a population, no matter how marginal, runs the associative risk of perpetuating a 
‘ghettoised’ sub-culture of hate and alienation amongst them towards state and society.  
Having said this, there is a fine line between persuasive prevention and too little state 
interference. Some worrying currents of religious intolerance are beginning to emerge in 
Indonesia to the determinant of the human security of minorities.[28] Rather than the much 
lauded ‘unity in diversity’, accusations abound that government officials and members of the 
police are tacitly and in some cases openly complicit in allowing hardline Islamist vigilantes to 
intimidate and incite discrimination against religious minorities.[29] The reluctance of authorities 
to curb their hate speech, incitement to violence, intimidation and training activities represents a 
growing trend. Paying little notice to certain types of intolerance and acts of intimidation is 
tantamount to condoning the suppression of religious freedom of expression in the eyes of some 
outside observers.[30] Prosecutions do occur but they are all too infrequent and usually lenient. 
Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Bakor Pakem - Coordinating Board 
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for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society) further normalises and reinforces the acceptability of 
intolerant attitudes and practices through its influential role in recommending the banning of 
certain religious sects/groups to the Attorney General’s Office and its active pursuing of 
prosecutions for blasphemy. [31]
International Cooperation and Regional Efforts 
In the wider context of the ‘War on Terror’ and growing international pressure for more definitive 
action against extremism, we have witnessed Indonesia issuing Anti-terrorism Decrees No.1 and 
No.2/2002. This move even received widespread domestic support desp i t e  t he  f ac t  t ha t  i t  
gave  Badan Intelijens Negara (BIN—the National Intelligence Agency) greater powers in the 
identification and detention of suspects. Economic aid incentives and logistical assistance from the 
US Department of State’s Anti-Terrorist Assistance program and from the Australian government 
have also bolstered threat reduction capacity. The TNI and POLRI especially Densus 88 have been 
the main beneficiaries of this largesse. They have received large amounts of equipment, technical 
support and training. This has even included the construction of multimillion-dollar training facility 
partly funded by Australia. 
In fact, the last decade has brought Indonesia and Australia (an important regional partner of the 
US) closer together in making inroads against a perceived extremist threat. The Australian 
government committed AUD$36.8million over 5 years in cooperation with the Indonesian 
government to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004. 
Based at Indonesian National Police Academy (AKPOL) in Semarang, this bilateral initiative 
provides a joint police training program for combatting terrorism. Not all joint efforts have been as 
successful. The Australian Federal Police also had a hand in helping set up the now defunct 
Multinational Operation Support Team (MNOST) in Jakarta. It was supposed to provide a locus for 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines to share information 
and expertise on terrorism issues and de-radicalisation programs. Having said this, the Indonesian 
government is certainly now better positioned to coordinate its anti-terrorist efforts not only 
with Australia but also with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.[32] In fact, Indonesia will 
host the ASEAN plus Eight joint exercises in counter terrorism at the Indonesia Peace and Security 
Center in Bogor, West Java in September 2014.  All of which is especially important in combatting 
pan-regional threats and enhancing the common security of the strategically vital Malacca Straits. 
Despite both the strategic and human security threats posed by militant Islamist groups, a mounting 
body of evidence suggests that the transnational jihadist project is failing in Indonesia.[33] A 
splintered jihadist community simply does not elicit broad-based popular support for its violent 
tactics. As they descend into factionalism, many radical groups have shifted their emphasis toward a 
more surreptitious indoctrination of the jihadist message.[34] This involves dakwah 
(proselytization/religious outreach) as an alternative strategy for building support for their project 
rather than the direct enlistment for indiscriminate terror activities.[35] Regardless of these efforts 
to build grassroots support for Islamist jihad insurgency especially amongst the youth, mainstream 
Indonesian society continues to marginalise them. For instance, hard-line organisations like MMI, 
LMI, FPI and AMIN led renewed recruitment attempts in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami under the 
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guise of providing humanitarian aid and dakwah but met with little community support.[36] The 
fact that the tsunami had simply wiped out many of their previous support networks in the region 
further thwarted their efforts. As mentioned, an even starker reality is that Densus 88 has crippled 
JI. Many of its leading figures and many other Islamist militants are now languishing in prison or 
dead. All of this indicates a diminished macro-threat environment and a more manageable strategic 
security situation.
Conclusion
Please do not think I am being too optimistic here. I am not. Radical organisations like FPI may be 
slowly realising that politics and bombs do not mix but violent intimidation of so-called ‘heretics’ 
and ‘deviants’ by its associated ‘thugs’ or the local mobs they help incite still goes on largely 
unabated.[37] In fact, the human security threat to religious minorities remains a major problem. 
Intimidation and attacks against local religious minorities and their places of worship is actually 
increasing as the strategic threat decreases. Groups like FPI appear to be able to carry out their 
vigilante activities with relative impunity. The unwillingness of authorities to tackle this ‘grey area’ 
between radicalism and outright terrorist activity or intervene for whatever political reasons is 
essentially allowing them to do as they please. It signals an increasing atmosphere of intolerance 
and a worrying failure of the state to uphold its human rights obligations to protect religious 
minorities.[38] The seeming legitimation of intolerance by regency and municipality authorities 
who pass bylaws banning certain religious sects feeds this growing concern. The worry is that this 
provides fertile conditions for incubating a transformation of intolerance and radical thinking into 
more homegrown forms of violence and terror. [39]
Although the diminishing appeal and promotion of jihadi ideology is limited to the extreme fringes 
of Indonesian society, it does continue to metastasise in new ways especially amongst disaffected 
and impressionable youth who fall into the jihadist orbit via radical dakwah groups.[40] A lack of 
coordinated management of radical organisations, lax money transfer regulation and porous, 
notoriously difficult to patrol borders facilitate the spread. The movement of funds and personnel to 
vulnerable conflict prone areas are a less than challenging exercise. Whether the implementation of 
Law No. 9/2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Financing will stem these flows is 
still an open question. A pressing strategic threat could re-emerge without a financially coordinated 
and genuine effort to de-radicalise radical groupings and promote tolerance. As such, the 
management of security threats both strategic and human remains a priority with a continued 
commitment required to yield meaningful containment. I think the main thing the Indonesian 
experience highlights is the complex and interlinked character of strategic and human security. 
There are no simple categorisations or solutions, but rather matters of degree and increments. 
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advocate of a more co-ordinated coalition between organisations (lintas tanzim) in regards activities and longer-term strategic goals. 
Part of his strategic agenda was to enforce shari’a through jihad and promote the ‘correct’ form of Islam by means of dakwah. The 
thinking being that inculcating community support for their aims would assist in the objective of establishing secure bases across 
different regions and these bases could then further consolidate the Islamist insurgent message and project. 
[36] See  ICG (2010). “Indonesia: Jihadi surprise in Aceh.” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 189, 20 April, Jakarta/
Brussels, pp. 1-27 and Hwang J.C. (2012). Terrorism in perspective: An assessment of ‘Jihad Project’ trends in Indonesia. Asia 
Pacific Issues, No. 104, September, Honolulu: East-West Center, pp. 1-12. 
[37] Having said this, FPI’s chairman and founder, Habib Muhammad Riziek Syihab did receive a 1.5 year jail term in 2008 for 
inciting attacks against a gathering held by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief in Jakarta that injured seventy 
demonstrators.
[38] Indonesia is a party (signed and ratified) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.  
[39] In 2012, Densus 88 arrested 11 suspects accused of planning attacks on several high-profile targets. They were from a relatively 
new homegrown splinter group, Hasmi (the Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society). Even more recently, police arrested several 
terror suspects supposedly led by the Abu Hanifah cell. The latter also has links to the Abu Omar network that operated in Surakarta 
and Cirebon, West Java. They were allegedly plotting attacks against the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta and several US targets in Java 
in response to the persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar.
[40] There are multiple recruitment paths into Islamist militancy whether it be spiritual, intellectual or kinship based. But the dakwah 
activities of jihadist groups and hardline clerics can often gain an initial surreptitious access to young Indonesians through former 
links with the wide and complex network of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) that traverse Indonesia. These secretive jihadist 
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groups can then lure students into joining exclusive prayer groups or religious discussions outside campuses, an entry point for 
potential radicalisation. Of course, stating this is not to implicate pesantren in the spread of a radical Islamist message as the vast 
majority of these institutions play vital socio-cultural, religious and educational roles in Indonesian society. In fact, given their 
embeddedness in the social fabric of Indonesia, those pesantren with long established credentials are in many ways a bulwark against 
radicalism.
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